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Introduction 
 
Alain Badiou is known to be a principled opponent of biopolitics.1 His political writings since 
the 1982 Theory of the Subject onwards have featured passionate polemics against the 
reduction of politics, which Badiou ranks among the four ‘truth procedures’ along with art, 
science and love, to the management of the bare existence of human beings.2 For Badiou 
biopolitics is one of the manifestations of contemporary nihilism, a time devoid of truths. To 
the ethico-political discourses that valorize the ‘human animal’ and assign the supreme 
value to its life Badiou has famously opposed his version of a militant politics of fidelity to 
the event that ruptures the existing forms of life in any given world. This praxis, whose 
variations Badiou finds throughout human history from the slave rebellions of the Antiquity 
through the peasant wars of the Reformation to the revolutionary war in China, produces in 
the world what Badiou calls its truth, which transcends the particular features of worldly 
beings and transforms the world in its entirety on the basis of the idea of equality.  
Badiou is certainly not alone in being critical of the phenomena usually placed under the 
rubric of biopolitics - most of the scholars of biopolitics have also been less than optimistic 
with respect to the transformations in the government of life they have analyzed.3 Where 
Badiou differs from these authors is that while these authors nonetheless approach 
biopolitics as the inescapable tendency of late-modern politics that must be reckoned with 
in the hope of being transformed, he quite unapologetically abandons the very problematic 
of biopolitics in favour of the politics of militant activism that sets the concerns of ‘mere life’ 
aside in favour of the constitution of a new, different, true life.  
In this article we shall argue that it is precisely this move of setting mere life aside that 
makes problematic Badiou’s claim to abandon or overcome the biopolitical paradigm. Our 
argument unfolds in three steps. In the first section we shall reconstruct Badiou’s account of 
the contemporary biopolitical regime that he terms ‘democratic materialism’ and his 
alternative politics of subjective incorporation into the ‘body of truth’. In the second section 
we shall demonstrate that Badiou’s ‘anti-biopolitics’ replicates the basic logic of biopolitics 
as formulated by Giorgio Agamben: the inclusive exclusion of bare life, which figures in the 
political order of bios solely in the mode of being set aside to the margins. Badiou’s ‘body of 
truth’ is dependent on the incorporation of the actual bodies of human beings in order to 
sustain the truth procedure, even as it simultaneously expects them to set the concerns and 
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interests of these bodies aside to attain a new, better or truer life. Yet, the introduction of 
ideas of how life is to be governed or transformed does not do anything  to change the basic 
setting of the capture of life as the object of power - if anything, by seeking to transform this 
life into something  new it manifests this capture ever more starkly. Thus, our first 
conclusion is that rather than exemplify a successful overcoming of biopolitics, Badiou’s 
politics of truth ends up a paradigmatic expression of the biopolitical logic.  
Yet, such an interpretation remains insufficient insofar as it does not pay attention to the 
content of Badiou’s truths and the process of their generation, which make his version of 
biopolitics genuinely different from the more familiar forms of biopolitics. In the third 
section we shall therefore trace the unfolding of the truth procedure in Being and Event in 
order to demonstrate how the emergence of Badiou’s truth in the fidelity to the 
undecidable event deprives it of all positive, ‘encyclopedic’ content and makes it an generic 
subset of the situation, whose essence is indiscernible but whose existence is assured. The 
truth of the situation or world is contained in their very being as inconsistent multiplicities 
prior to any internal ordering and structuration. This thesis recalls Agamben’s definition of 
affirmative biopolitics as the constitution of a bios that is only its own zoe, in which the logic 
of inclusive exclusion becomes inoperative, because bios and zoe are ultimately indistinct. 
We shall demonstrate that despite their many differences, Agamben and Badiou actually 
espouse a very similar onto-political orientation, in which generic, indiscernible ‘whatever 
being’ becomes the basis for undermining and transforming worlds, whose positive orders 
have no ontological foundation. We therefore conclude that Badiou is neither an opponent 
nor a proponent of biopolitics as we know it, but rather presents a version of ‘affirmative 
biopolitics’, which opposes to the biopolitical negation of bare life an emancipatory politics 
derived from life itself. 
 
Bodies and Truths: Badiou on Democratic Materialism 
 
Badiou begins his Logics of Worlds with a striking summation of the ‘natural belief’ or 
spontaneous ideology of late-modern Western societies: ‘There are only bodies and 
languages.’4 Badiou terms this ideology democratic materialism. It is a materialism because 
‘[the] contemporary world recognizes the objective existence of bodies alone. Who does not 
de facto subscribe to the dogma of our finitude, of our carnal exposition to enjoyment, 
suffering and death? ’5 If there are only bodies, if existence itself is only conceivable as 
biological life, humanity is reduced to an ‘overstretched version of animality’: ‘’Human 
rights’ are the same as the rights of the living. The humanist protection of all living bodies: 
this is the norm of contemporary materialism. Today, this norm has a scientific  name: 
‘bioethics’, whose progressive reverse borrows its name from Foucault: ‘biopolitics’. Our 
materialism is therefore a materialism of life. It is a bio-materialism.’6  
Why is this bio-materialism democratic? This is because it recognizes all the languages that 
these bodies use as formally or juridically equal: ‘[The] assimilation of humanity to animality 
culminates in the identification of the human animal with the diversity of its subspecies and 
the democratic rights that inhere in this diversity. Communities and cultures, colours and 
pigments, religions and clergies, uses and customs: everything and everyone deserves to be 
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recognized and protected by the law.’7 Everyone, that is, except those who refuse to 
recognize the universal equality of particular languages and wish to regulate other 
languages and bodies. All that democratic materialism does not tolerate is ‘totalitarianism’, 
understood as the desire to elevate the status of some bodies or some languages to the 
dominant status. Instead, bodies and languages are set free to interact and compete in the 
space regulated only by the general equivalent that assumes the form of money. 
Democratic materialism is thus the latest name Badiou gives to the spontaneous ideology of 
contemporary capitalism. 
This description of democratic materialism echoes Badiou’s earlier polemic in Ethics against 
the ethics of human rights and responsibility to otherness, whose ontological precondition is 
precisely the world composed solely of bodies and languages, whose existence must be 
protected against violence, respectively physical and cultural.8 At the heart of Badiou’s 
critique of this ethics is, firstly, its reduction of the human being to the ‘living animal’, a 
‘biped without feathers whose charms are not obvious’.9 While, as we shall see below, for 
Badiou the human is defined by its capacity for transcending its animality and becoming the 
subject of the immortal truth (super-human), the ethics of human rights reduces the human 
to a potential victim of violence or oppression that destroys its very humanity, a sub-human. 
While avowedly concerned with the life and happiness of human being, this ethics remains 
perversely fascinated by death since ‘it is the only thing that can really happen to 
someone’.10  
 
Secondly, Badiou opposes the valorization of the differences between speaking bodies, be 
they cultural, national or religious. His main target here is the Levinasian-Derridean ethics of 
responsibility to otherness, which he sees as oscillating between an ultimately rel igious 
discourse of piety before the wholly Other and a hypocritical ‘sociological’ discourse, in 
which the empirical other is celebrated as long as it respects the differences of others, i.e. 
enacts the identity of tolerance, multiculturalism, etc.  ‘Ethical ideology, detached from the 
religious teachings which at least conferred upon it the fullness of a ‘revealed’ identity, is 
simply the final imperative of a conquering civilization: ‘Become like me and I will respect 
your difference.’11 Against these two equally unpalatable versions of the ethics of otherness, 
Badiou argues that difference must be deposed as an ethical principle and rethought as an 
elementary ontological fact: 
  
[Infinite] alterity is quite simply what is. Any experience at all is the inf inite 
deployment of infinite differences. But what we must recognize is that these 
differences hold no interest for thought, that they amount to nothing more 
than the infinite and self-evident multiplicity of humankind, as obvious in the 
difference between me and my cousin from Lyon as it is between the Shiite 
‘community’ of Iraq and the fat cowboys of Texas.12  
 
While the differences between bodies and languages are in themselves ethically indifferent, 
the true beneficiary of the ethics of alterity is the space of general equivalence constituted 
between them: ‘Capital demands a permanent creation of subjective and territorial 
identities in order for its principle of movement to homogenize its space of action; 
identities, moreover, that never demand anything but the right to be exposed in the same 
way as others to the uniform prerogatives of the market. The capitalist logic of the general 
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equivalent and the identitarian and cultural logic of communities or minorities form an 
articulated whole.’13  
Let us now consider the way Badiou articulates his alternative to democratic-materialist 
biopolitics. After briefly toying with the idea of naming his approach ‘aristocratic idealism’ 14, 
Badiou settles on the term ‘materialist dialectic’, which introduces into the dual istic 
axiomatic of bodies and languages a third term in the manner of the exception: ‘there are 
only bodies and language, except that there are truths’: ‘There is no doubt whatsoever 
concerning the existence of truths which are not bodies, languages or combinations of the 
two. These truths are incorporeal bodies, languages devoid of meaning, generic infinities, 
unconditional supplements.’15 Badiou does not disagree with the fact that what there is are, 
for the most part, bodies and languages, manifested to us in their difference that is of no 
political or philosophical consequence. Yet, that’s not all there is in the world and what is 
politically relevant is precisely that which transcends bodies, languages and the market in 
which they are rendered equivalent. Truths occur as an exception to what is – they are 
neither bodily nor linguistic, even though, as we shall see, their unfolding in the world is 
dependent on both. 
For Badiou, truths are ‘wholly singular bodies (post-evental bodies) which compose the 
multiple materiality wherein special formalisms (subjective formalisms) are set out.’16 Like 
everything else in the world, truths are bodies, yet they are nonetheless bodies of a 
different and somewhat paradoxical kind: eternal even though produced in empirical  time, 
trans-linguistic even though inscribed in a particular language, infinite even if upheld by 
finite beings. Truth is a body that has been marked by an event erupting in the world, whose 
consequences are ‘operated’ by the subject. The theorization of this new body takes up 
most of the six hundred pages of Logics, where Badiou first develops an ‘objective 
phenomenology’ of worlds and supplements it with an account of the appearance in these 
worlds of ‘transworldly’ post-evental truths affirmed by faithful subjects.  
In technical terms, the body of truth is constituted by the process of incorporation of the 
elements of the site, where the event erupts, into the traces of its eruption (‘the evental 
present’). This body will then be able to ‘treat’ various points of the transcendental order of 
the world, deciding for or against the persistence of the truth procedure.17 It is important to 
stress that it is the formation of this new body and not the mere eruption of the event that 
makes the truth procedure possible: if no elements of the site incorporate themselves to 
the evental present, the world in question will remain ‘inconsequential’ even if the event 
did take place therein.18 In contrast, the constitution of the body of truth generates the 
faithful subject that is able to produce the positive consequences of the event in its world. 
Thus, whereas democratic materialism correlates ‘life and individuals’, his materialist 
dialectics correlates ‘truth and subjects’.19 This statement clearly demonstrates Badiou’s 
eagerness to take distance from biopolitics: while democratic materialism can only envision 
politics in terms of the regulation of the actualization by bodies of their vital resources, for 
materialist dialectic politics presupposes the appearance of a new body of truth, and of the 
subject (individual or collective) that is constituted by incorporation into this body.  
Can a politics that operates with the categories of truth and subject dispense with the 
notion of life? Badiou recognizes that ‘life’ has become the central ‘signifier of democratic 
materialism’ and even subsumes Foucault’s philosophy, that of biopolitics included, under 
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this signifier as a ‘linguistic anthropology’, a philosophy for which there is also nothing but 
bodies and languages.20 He nonetheless insists that the word may still be salvaged for 
philosophy in the manner that evades the doxa of democratic materialism by producing a 
‘new definition of bodies, understood as bodies of truth, or subjectivizable bodies’.21  He 
then proceeds to redefine life as ‘participation, point by point, in the organization of a new 
body, in which a faithful subjective formalism comes to take root’.22 In the final chapter of 
Logics entitled ‘What is it to live?’ the difference between the life of democratic materialism 
and Badiou’s ‘true life’ is accentuated most starkly: ‘‘To live’ obviously not in the sense of 
democratic materialism (persevering in the free virtualities of the body) but rather in the 
sense of Aristotle’s enigmatic formula: ‘to live as an Immortal’.23 ‘True life’ is not 
determined by the world and its ways, but rather by what ‘inappears’ in the world, i.e. the 
event whose occurrence is immediately evanescent yet leaves traces in the form of the 
maximized intensity of existence of those elements formerly consigned to the status of the 
‘inexistent’ of the world. To live truly is to incorporate oneself in this evental present, to 
actively participate in the unfolding of the consequences of the event, to be a faithful 
subject of the new body of truth. There are of course other possibilities. The reactive 
subjective formalism seeks to erase every trace of the event, restoring the ways of the world 
as if nothing had taken place. The obscure formalism seeks to destroy the post-evental body 
of truth and replace it with a phantasmatic transcendent body, in which there is no division 
and no place for an event.24 
[Life] is a subjective category. A body is the materiality that life requires, but 
the becoming of the present depends on the disposition of this body in a 
subjective formalism. To live is thus an incorporation into the present under 
the faithful form of a subject. If the incorporation is dominated by the 
reactive form, one will not speak of life but of mere conservation. It is a 
question of protecting oneself from the consequences of a birth, of not 
relaunching existence beyond itself. If incorporation is dominated by the 
obscure formalism, one will instead speak of mortification.25   
 
 
While the reactive subject exemplifies the conservative (‘ill-named’) life drive and the 
obscure subject exemplifies the ‘death instinct’, life in the body of truth is ‘what gets the 
better of the drives’ (ibid.: 509).26 This life takes exception from the order of bodies and 
languages and thereby introduces into the world the dimension of the Idea. Badiou’s 
difference from democratic materialism is particularly vivid with regard to the Idea. In the 
world of only bodies and languages any reference to an Idea, particularly when capitalized, 
is suspect as the ‘totalitarian’ attempt to absolutize one’s language as the one all speaking 
bodies must abide by. Yet, in Badiou’s politics of truth the Idea is precisely not a language 
(even if it might rely on linguistic forms), but the experience of subjectivation transcending 
the bodily-linguistic resources of the world. One’s submission to the Idea is then not the 
experience of servitude but rather of authentic freedom that, depending on the type of the 
truth in question, takes the form of joy (science), happiness (love), pleasure (art) or 
enthusiasm (politics).27 
Since it does not recognize the exceptional existence of truths, the biopolitics of democratic 
materialism remains hostile to the Idea as such, proclaiming ‘the end of ideologies’ as the 
good news, making it possible for speaking bodies to finally ‘live without Idea’. While it is 
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ostensibly a humanist ideology, democratic materialism only affirms that within the human 
which is reducible to the animal and fears that ‘inhuman’ capacity for truths that, for 
Badiou, makes the human in the first place: ‘if one fails to recognize the effects of those 
traces in which the inhuman commands humanity to exceed its being-there, it will be 
necessary, in order to maintain a purely animalistic, pragmatic notion of the human species, 
to annihilate both these traces and their infinite consequences. The democratic materialist 
is a fearsome and intolerant enemy of every human – which is to say inhuman – life worthy 
of the name.’28  
And yet, there is a perpetual possibility for human beings to avoid both conservation and 
mortification and embark on a true life. This is because for Badiou the human being 
traverses numerous worlds throughout its existence.  There must therefore be some worlds 
in which an event, the first condition of the truth, has happened or is happening, and which 
therefore offer the possibility of setting aside one’s mere life for a new life in the body of 
truth.  
Incessantly in some accessible world something happens. Several times in its brief 
existence, every human animal is granted the chance to incorporate itself into the 
subjective present of a truth. The grace of living for an Idea, that is living as such, is 
accorded to everyone and for several types of procedure. The infinite of worlds is 
what saves us from every finite dis-grace. Finitude, the constant harping on of our 
mortal being, in brief, the fear of death as our only passion – these are the bitter 
ingredients of democratic materialism. We overcome all this when we seize hold of 
the discontinuous variety of worlds and the interlacing of objects under the 
constantly variable regimes of their appearances. We are open to the infinity of 
worlds. To live is possible. Therefore, to (re)commence to live is the only thing that 
matters.29  
This is what a true life is: a life constituted by the participation in the post-evental body of 
truth, whereby the mortal animal ‘overcomes’ the finitude of its mere bodily existence and 
becomes a subject of the immortal truth. While the valorization of l ife in the biopolitics of 
democratic materialism produces only its negative obverse of the preoccupation with 
finitude and the fear of death, Badiou’s politics of truth achieves a true life of maximal 
existential intensity by setting aside all concerns with one’s finitude, subordinating one’s 
mere animality (sub-humanity) for the process of the construction of the super-human 
bodies of truth. Biopolitics as politics of mere life is overcome by the politics of truth that 
alone makes it possible to truly live.  
  
The Body of Truth and the Return of Biopolitics 
 
While Badiou’s politics of truth has been critically addressed from a variety of 
perspectives,30 what interests us is its presentation as an alternative to biopolitics. This 
presentation appears questionable from the outset, insofar as Badiou is neither willing nor 
able to abandon the very terms that define the biopolitical regime that he criticizes. Firstly, 
the ‘intra-worldly’ advance of the truth procedure requires material support in the living 
body, without which it remains abstract and impotent. The transworldly body of truth is 
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ultimately composed of the worldly physical bodies, even as it aspires to transcend their 
particularity: ‘The Immortal exists only in and by the mortal animal.’31 We may speak either 
of the incarnation of the truth in the body of the human animal or the incorporation of this 
animal into a new, subjective ‘body of truth’ – either way, the truth procedure cannot 
proceed without latching on to the bodies it desires to transcend.  
Secondly, the result of incorporation into the body of truth is nothing other than life and, 
moreover, ‘living as such’.32 The setting aside of the mere life of the subhuman animal leads 
to a true life, which ‘gets the better’ of bio-psychological drives and makes it possible to live 
‘as an Immortal’. There is certainly a difference between the two notions of life at work 
here, the sub- and the super-human ones, but life itself remains the sole horizon of politics. 
In fact, it is precisely the move from one notion of life to another, from one body to another, 
that defines biopolitics in Giorgio Agamben’s famous interpretation. For Agamben 
biopolitics begins with the ‘inclusive exclusion’ of zoe (unqualified life that we share with 
both animals and gods) into bios (a qualified form of life in the polis).33 The constitution of 
bios as the political form of life presupposes the entry of zoe into this realm in the 
marginalized, subordinated or suppressed position: it is included in the polis, but solely in 
the mode of its exclusion from it, as a negative foundation, ‘as if politics were the place in 
which life had to transform itself into good life and in which what had to be politicized were 
always already bare life’.34 Just as in his earlier Language and Death Agamben traced the 
logic of negative foundation at the heart of language,35 whereby the natural voice of the 
living being is negated for signifying discourse to become possible, in Homo Sacer he 
demonstrates how every qualified form of political existence is founded on the inclusive 
exclusion of zoe that figures in the polis in the destitute and degraded form of bare life.36 
[The] question ‘in what way does the living being have language?’ corresponds 
exactly to the question ‘In what way does bare life dwell in the polis?’ The living 
being has logos by taking away and conserving its own voice in it, even as it dwells in 
the polis by letting its own bare life be excluded, as an exception, within it. There is 
politics because man is the living being who, in language, separates and opposes 
himself to his own bare life and, at the same time, maintains himself in relation to 
that bare life in an inclusive exclusion.37  
 
It is easy to observe the parallels between this logic and the constitution of Badiou’s ‘body 
of truth’. As Agamben himself argued, ‘[Badiou] still conceives of the subject on the basis of 
a contingent encounter with truth, leaving aside the living being as the ‘animal of the human 
species’ as a mere support for this encounter.’38 Incorporating itself into the evental 
present, the human animal sets aside its animality or zoe in order to constitute a new form 
of life (bios) in the body of truth. The true life of the superhuman subject is obtained by the 
isolation of the physical life of the subhuman ‘mortal animal’ as its material support. The 
finite body of the human animal that Badiou derisively dismisses as a charmless ‘biped 
without feathers’ is absolutely necessary for the new body of truth to be possible, yet in this 
new body it no longer plays an important role, its particular interests and desires set aside in 
favour of the universal content of the truths.  Moreover, the human animal is not merely set 
aside but also ends up ‘disciplined’ for the purposes of the more effective unfolding of the 
truth procedure: ‘I place heroism on the side of discipline, the only weapon both of the True 
and of peoples, against power and wealth, against the insignificance and the dissipation of 
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the mind. But this discipline demands to be invented, as the coherence of a subjectivizable 
body. Then it can no longer be distinguished from our own desire to live.’39 Evidently, 
discipline cannot be distinguished from the expression of the desire to live only if by ‘life’ we 
mean, as Badiou does, the participation in the body of truth. Yet, this is only possible if the 
mere life of the speaking body is set aside to the margins of the new body, into which it is 
nonetheless included as a necessary material support.  
Yet, what about the democratic materialism that Badiou opposes? Isn’t the latter the 
exemplary form of biopolitics, taking as its sole object the mere finite existence of speaking 
bodies? This is certainly true, yet only insofar as Badiou’s formula is completed. The 
statement ‘there are only bodies and languages’ does not in itself authorize any biopolitics 
(or any other kind of politics for that matter). It is a strictly ontological claim that is 
politically indifferent: there is no reason why these bodies and languages should be 
privileged objects of politics, its material supports or serve any other function. In order to 
make this formula biopolitical we must add to it the specification of the form of  life (bios) 
that these bodies are to be inclusively excluded from or, in Badiou’s lexicon, of the body of 
truth into which they should be negatively incorporated: there are only bodies and 
languages except that there is the truth, into whose body they are incorporated. This 
specification is necessary even if the truth in question consists precisely in the valorization 
of speaking bodies as ‘all there is’. In fact, this is precisely the mode of biopolitics that, in 
Agamben’s argument, characterizes the late-modern condition, marked by the decline or 
‘bankruptcy’ of the familiar forms of bios (liberalism, socialism, nationalism, etc.), which 
leaves bare life as the last legitimate object of political power:  ‘The only task that still seems 
to retain some seriousness is the assumption of the burden of biological life, that is, of the 
very animality of man.’40 While this nihilistic biopolitics is possible and perhaps to some 
degree actual in contemporary Western societies, it only exemplifies the extreme case of 
the biopolitical logic and not its paradigm. To be against the nihilism of ‘democratic 
materialism’, as Badiou is, is not to oppose biopolitics as such.  Politics becomes biopolitics 
when it captures zoe inside the bios that it constitutes, not when it ends up, for lack of other 
objects, applying itself to zoe exclusively.41 
Moreover, Badiou’s own presentation of democratic materialism gives us reason to doubt 
that the condition he describes is indeed reducible to a purely nihilistic management of the 
‘very animality of man’, a life that is truly ‘without Idea’. Let us recall Badiou’s claim that the 
juridical equality of all bodies and languages functions as a regulative principle permitting 
the exclusion and even elimination of those bodies and languages that claim ascendancy 
over others in a quasi-totalitarian manner.42 Similarly, in Ethics Badiou asserts that the 
valorization of otherness tends to coexist with the fear of ‘[any] vigorously sustained 
difference. African customs are barbaric, Muslims are dreadful, the Chinese are totalitarian, 
and so on. This celebrated ‘other’ is acceptable only if he is a good other, which is to say, the 
same as us.’43 The existence of a ‘halting point’ to tolerance and multiculturalism, whereby 
the other’s own tolerance becomes the condition of the tolerance of the other, clearly goes 
beyond the sheer ontological affirmation of there being only bodies and languages. Instead, 
‘tolerance’ or ‘multiculturalism’ constitute precisely the form of life (bios) into which 
speaking bodies are incorporated as subjects of the truth that transcends bodies and 
languages and subjects them to a certain discipline and, if necessary, punishment. The logic 
of the inclusive exclusion of zoe into bios is thus clearly operative even in the forms of life, in 
which zoe and bios are almost indistinct. 
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Thus, we cannot agree with Badiou’s interpretation of democratic materialism in terms of a 
purely nihilistic injunction to live without Ideas. Any investigation of the spontaneous 
ideology of contemporary Western societies would easily point to the idea of freedom as 
the key component of the contemporary biopolitical rationality, in the name of which 
bodies and languages may be mobilized, disciplined and occasionally even annihilated. 
While it might be tempting to interpret contemporary neoliberalism in a quasi-Heideggerian 
manner as the nihilistic surrender to the nothingness of mere life, the evidence, e.g. from 
the studies of neoliberal governmentality, rather seems to point to its successful 
mobilization of all aspects of life in the service of the idea of freedom, specified in the 
economic terms of enterprise.44 Badiou certainly does not like this idea and would refuse to 
grant it the status of a truth,45 but it does not follow from this that the neoliberal idea of 
freedom is somehow reducible to the being of bodies and languages themselves. 
We end up with an image that is rather different from the initial stark contrast between the 
biopolitics of democratic materialism and the politics of truth prescribed by materialist 
dialectics. Instead, both of these forms of politics exemplify the operation of the biopolitical 
logic of the inclusive exclusion of ‘mere life’ as the negative foundation of ‘good life’ (or 
‘true life’). This evidently does not invalidate Badiou’s criticism of democratic materialism as 
a particular mode of biopolitics, but only his own attempt to transcend biopolitics by 
introducing new forms of bios to replace the ‘truths’ of tolerance, multiculturalism or 
entrepreneurialism, which he despises. There is no idea without a relation to life, hence 
Badiou’s truth procedure remains biopolitical, but there is also no politics without ideas, 
hence democratic materialism is not without a certain ‘truth-content’ of its own. We may 
then conclude that attempts to overcome biopolitics that posit themselves as purely 
ideational, ideological or ideocratic, i.e. located on one side of the divide between life and 
idea, the vital and the symbolic, necessarily presuppose this divide and inevitably cross it in 
the search of the incarnation for the ideas that they affirm. What we find ‘beyond’ 
biopolitics is nothing but the potentiality, if not the aspiration, for becoming biopolitical. 
  
Generic Truths and Affirmative Biopolitics 
 
It would be possible to stop here, having demonstrated the belonging of Badiou’s 
materialist-dialectical ‘politics of truth’ to the same biopolitical logic that he seeks to 
overcome. Yet, such a reading would be somewhat uncharitable, though not exactly wrong, 
since there remains an important qualitative difference between the truth that Badiou 
affirms and the ideology of democratic materialism. In the previous sections we have 
focused on Badiou’s account of the formal constitution of the body of truth, which is indeed 
strictly homologous to the biopolitical ‘inclusive exclusion’ of bare life, practiced by 
democratic materialism and other familiar modes of biopolitics. Would things be any 
different if we now turned our attention to the content of Badiou’s truths? Evidently, no 
variation in content would change the formal belonging of the politics of truth to the 
biopolitical logic. Yet, it is possible that it might produce a different kind of biopolitics.  
The theme of affirmative biopolitics, which does not negate, exclude or dominate the life 
that it governs, has been addressed in various ways in contemporary Italian political 
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theory.46 For our purposes, Agamben’s formulation at the end of Homo Sacer would be 
most instructive: ‘This biopolitical body that is bare life must itself instead be transformed 
into the site for the constitution and installation of a form of life that is wholly exhausted in 
bare life and a bios that is only its own zoe.’47 Agamben’s thesis is simultaneously enigmatic 
and rigorous. Indeed, if biopolitics includes zoe into bios in the destitute mode of bare life 
whose negation founds the political form of life, then the only possibility for biopolitics to 
refrain from this negation and begin to affirm life requires that bios and zoe become entirely 
indistinct. In this manner, life and its form would become entirely inseparable, bios being 
entirely contained in zoe, so that it is ‘no longer possible to isolate anything like a bare  
life’.48  
Agamben’s solution becomes clearer with the help of the analogy he draws between bare 
life in biopolitics and pure being in philosophy: 
[In] the syntagm ‘bare life’, ‘bare’ corresponds to the Greek haplos, the term by 
which first philosophy defines pure Being. And it may be that only if we are able to 
decipher the political meaning of pure Being will we be able to master the bare life 
that expresses our subjection to political power.49  
On the basis of this analogy between bare life and pure being Agamben establishes the 
political equivalent of Heidegger’s inversion of the relation between essence and existence 
in Being and Time.50 ‘Today bios lies in zoe exactly as essence, in the Heideggerian definition 
of Dasein, lies in existence.’51 If the essence of the human is unpresentable in terms of 
essential predicates (‘what one is’) but consists in the sheer facticity of its existence (‘that 
one is’), then the sole form of bios proper to the human is indeed its own zoe, whose 
facticity is no longer the negated foundation of bios but rather its entire content, there 
being no other form, essence, task or identity imposed on it. What Agamben calls form-of-
life, the hyphens emphasizing the integrity of life and its form, may then be understood as ‘a 
being that is its own bare existence, [a] life that, being its own form, remains inseparable 
from it’.52 
We encounter this figure of an integral form-of-life in the most diverse contexts of 
Agamben’s work: the ‘coming community’ of whatever singularities,53 the experimentum 
linguae that communicates the sheer existence of language and not its signified contents,54 
the ‘glorious body’ that is nothing but the earthly body divested of its functions and open to 
a new use,55 Franciscan monastic life extraneous to every law and norm,56 etc. What unites 
all of these diverse figures is their subtraction from every particular predicate and their 
exposure in the bare facticity of their existence or ‘being-thus’. A bios that is its own zoe is 
not some particular bios, some concrete form of life, but rather whatever bios, insofar as it 
is taken up solely in the aspect of its zoe. This obviously does not mean that this form of life 
is devoid of any real predicates but rather that these predicates are taken up all at once and 
thereby neutralized, no longer functioning as the conditions of belonging and exclusion: 
being-thus is ‘neither this nor that, neither thus nor thus, but thus, as it is, with all its 
predicates (all its predicates is not a predicate).’57  
 
At first glance, this idea of a form of life wholly exhausted in bare life is very far from 
Badiou’s line of thinking. As we have seen, Agamben has accused Badiou of sticking to a 
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traditional biopolitical move of constituting the subject by inclusively excluding life as mere 
material support for truth. On his part, Badiou has been highly critical of Agamben’s alleged 
valorization of bare life that is inherently devoid of truth.  
[Agamben’s] recurrent theme is being as weakness, its presentational poverty, 
power preserved from the glory of its act.  Likewise, in politics, the hero is the one 
brought back to its pure being as a transitory living being, the one who may be killed 
without judgment, the homo sacer of the Romans, the Muselmann of the 
extermination camp. Agamben, this Franciscan of ontology, prefers, to the 
affirmative becoming of truths, the delicate, almost secret persistence of life, what 
remains to one who no longer has anything; this forever sacrificed ‘bare life’, both 
humble and essential, which conveys everything of which we – crushed by the crass 
commotion of powers – are capable of in terms of sense.58  
This interpretation of Agamben is easily understandable from the activist-militant 
perspective of Badiou’s politics of truth. Indeed, when it comes to politics the two authors 
tend to express themselves in rather different idioms. While Agamben does tend to focus on 
marginalized, oppressed and dehumanized figures, Badiou privileges heroic figures of grand 
politics (Spartacus, Muentzer, Mao).59 However, these differences may obscure a more 
subtle yet also more fundamental proximity between the two authors. Agamben and Badiou 
share the ontological approach to politics as the process of the affirmation of pure being 
against the radically contingent orders of worlds (Badiou) or apparatuses of government 
(Agamben), which have no ontological foundation. Just as Agamben’s form-of-life is 
subtracted from every determination and only exposes its own existence, Badiou’s truths 
lack any positive predicates and manifest nothing but the being of the ‘situation’ or ‘world’ 
as an inconsistent multiplicity. In the remainder of this section we shall revisit Badiou’s 
account of the unfolding of the truth procedure in Being and Event and demonstrate that, 
for all the difference between Badiou’s set-theoretical and Agamben’s post-Heideggerian 
ontologies, the former author’s body of truth is strictly correlative to the latter’s form-of-
life. 
The event which initiates the truth procedure is defined by Badiou as composed of the 
elements of the evental site and itself. The evental site is a set that is absolutely singular, 
i.e., it belongs to the situation as an element but is not included into it in terms of its parts 
or subsets. Such a set is present in the situation as undecomposable, ‘all of a piece’, none of 
the elements that compose it being presented in the situation. For this reason it obviously 
cannot be counted in terms of its parts and thus remains without representation in the 
‘state of the situation’, which operates by grouping the elements of the origina l set into 
subsets: ‘Such a multiple is solely presented as the multiple-that-it-is. None of its terms are 
counted-for-one as such; only the multiple of these terms forms a one.’60 It is such 
absolutely singular sets that form sites of the event, without guaranteeing its actual 
eruption. 
 
The other component of the event is, paradoxically and from a strictly ontological 
perspective impossibly, the event itself. Since the ontological axioms of set theory prohibit 
self-belonging, the very occurrence of the event remains invisible from the ontological 
perspective: ‘Ontology has nothing to say about the event.’61 The belonging of the event to 
the situation must therefore be decided upon or ‘wagered’ in the procedure of intervention. 
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This procedure ‘names’ the unpresented elements that belong to the evental site, which is 
‘illegal’ from the ontological perspective, since it interrupts the representative structure of 
the state of the situation, which, as we have seen, cannot access the elements of this 
singular multiplicity. Thus, the intervention asserts ‘[t]he existence of representatives 
without any law of representation’.62 It affirms that the event is being able to designate it as 
a being. Thus, the effect of intervention is the assertion of the bare existence of an event, of 
its zoe rather than bios. 
  
The more positive consequences of the event for the situation are established in the 
procedure that Badiou terms fidelity, which groups together the elements of the situation, 
whose existence is dependent on the event in question. The result of this grouping is a 
subset of the situation that is indiscernible within it, i.e. cannot be identified by the language 
of the state of the situation that Badiou terms ‘encyclopedia’.63 It is this subset, which 
Badiou terms ‘generic’, that is granted the status of the truth of the situation, in distinction 
from the knowledge established in the ‘encyclopaedic’ language. This means that the truth 
cannot be grasped in terms of positive predicates that would make it possible for us to say 
that this or that aspect of the situation is true (or not). The generic subset ‘contains a little 
bit of everything [but] only possesses the properties necessary to its existence as multiple in 
its material. It does not possess any particular, discerning, separative property. At base, its 
sole property is that of consisting as pure multiple, of being. Subtracted from language, it 
makes do with its being.’64  
 
 
If the truth makes do with its being without being discernible in language, if it does not 
possess any particular properties, its content must be exhausted in what pertains to the 
situation’s very being prior to its internal structuration. Indeed, this is the only reason why 
this truth is deemed by Badiou to be universal, ‘the truth of the entire situation, truth of the 
being of the situation’.65 If it were otherwise, if the truth manifested some particular novel 
content arising from the event, it could never have universal consequences for the situation 
but would merely produce an extraneous addition to it. Yet, as we have seen, the event 
does not produce any new content, but rather presents what was always in the situation to 
begin with but was not presented therein. To this presentation the event merely adds itself 
as the signature of its action that ensures that its own presentation remains presented. 
Thus, the event is not understood by Badiou as the advent of unprecedented novelty from 
out of the blue, but the emergence as new of what always belonged to the situation. 
  
The same logic is at work in an even more accentuated manner in Logics of Worlds, where 
the consequence of the eruption of the event in a given world is the ascent of what was 
‘inexistent’ in it (the element of the world that did not appear in the world) to maximal 
existence.66 This maximal existence is certainly ‘new’ from the perspective of the world’s 
transcendental order but nothing new ontologically since the inexistent was in the world to 
begin with. Thus, the event and the post-evental truth procedure perform something like an 
‘ascent from appearance towards being’ or the rise of being itself to appearance.67 What the 
truth manifests is nothing more (and nothing less) than the being of the situation or world, 
which is that of inconsistent multiplicity,68 ordinarily concealed either by the structure of the 
situation (in the ontological terms of Being and Event) or the transcendental order of the 
world (in the phenomenological terms of Logics of Worlds).  
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It is easy to see that the truth that brings to appearance the being of the situation itself is 
strictly identical to Agamben’s form of life exhausted in bare life or a bios that is its own zoe. 
The ‘body of truth’, constituted in the procedure of fidelity, is a biopolitical body but, unlike 
other such bodies, it manages not to negate the living body of the human animal through its 
inclusive exclusion, only because what is ‘excluded’ from it (bare life as pure being) is exactly 
the same as what it is ‘included’ into (the truth as pure being). The body of truth is quite 
literally the same as the body of the living animal, yet it is not only that. Evidently, for 
Badiou’s truth procedure of politics (as well as art, science and love) to make any difference 
in the world, it should produce some content other than what we began with. It is this 
‘added value’ of the truth that apparently differentiates him from Agamben who is content 
with the politics of pure inoperativity.69 Yet, once again, the difference should not be 
overstated since for Badiou this content is both minimal and impossible to present as a 
positive political project. The sole content of the political truth procedure that he has 
recently elaborated in terms of the ‘communist hypothesis’.70 ‘Only a politics that can, in 
philosophy, be named an egalitarian politics entitles one to turn towards the eternal of the 
contemporary times in which this politics proceeds.’71 As we have seen, equality was also a 
principle asserted by the democratic materialism and, indeed, also the only principle 
asserted by it. The difference between Badiou’s politics of truth and the biopolitics he 
criticizes is thus entirely contained in the different concepts of equality that they utilize. 
While the juridical equality affirmed by democratic materialism is defined in programmatic 
terms as something to be attained in a political project (of recognition, protection, 
redistribution, etc.), Badiou’s equality is rather ‘immediately prescriptive’, since it always 
already characterizes the being of every world, however unequally it is ordered in its 
appearance. 72 
 
[The] word ‘equality’ must be secured in the absence of any economic 
connotations (equality of objective conditions, of status, of opportunity). It 
subjective trenchancy must be restored: equality is something that opens onto 
a strict logic of the Same. Its advantage, then, lies in its abstraction. Equality 
neither presumes closure, nor qualifies the terms it embraces, nor prescribes a 
territory for its exercise. This word would not include within it the theme of 
the social, or of redistribution, and less still that of solidarity, of State solicitude 
for differences. Equality here is a purely philosophical name. It is unhitched 
from every programme. [It means] that no lone singularity can have an 
entitlement that would render it unequal to any other. This can also be said: 
the essence of a truth is generic, that is, is without any differential trait that 
would allow it to be placed in a hierarchy on the basis of a predicate. And 
again: equality signifies that, from the vantage point of politics, what is 
presented has no need of being interpreted. What presents itself must be 
received in the nondescript nature and the egalitarian anonymity of its 
presentation as such.73  
 
It is easy to see that Badiou’s notion of equality is simply a logical consequence of the 
genericity of the truth itself and not some extraneous principle or value: it arises out of the 
very character of the truth procedure as the ascent to appearance of the unpresented or 
inexistent elements in the form of the indiscernible subset, which does not possess any 
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‘differential trait’ that would allow any unequal relation to be constituted. The indiscernible 
simply is without it being possible to specify, in the language of the situation, what it is: this 
is why it does not need to be and actually cannot be ‘interpreted’ but must be received in 
the sheer facticity of its existence, which is indeed characterized by ‘nondescript nature’ and 
‘egalitarian anonymity’. What this means is that Badiou’s equality is never economic, legal, 
cultural or any other specific equality, but the equality of beings in their being, whatever 
these beings are in their worldly appearance, identity or role and, indeed, whatever world 
they happen to appear in. It is important to recall that the entire truth procedure begins 
with the event, which brings to presentation the formerly unpresented elements of its site, 
asserting the equality of everything that is in the situation against the unequal distribution 
of presentation in it. Similarly, in the Logics of Worlds, the event entails the rise of the 
inexistent of the world to maximal existence in it, overturning the internal order of the 
distribution of degrees of appearances within the world. Equality is not a positive principle 
defining a certain bios, yet neither is it a mere attribute of zoe: were it not for the event, the 
unpresented and the inexistent would have remained such. Equality as truth is rather the 
result of the raising of the ontological attributes of zoe to the status of bios, the affirmation 
of unqualified and indeterminate life as the sole content of political life. 
  
Thus, Badiou’s body of truth manifests nothing but the bodies of living animals that 
compose it plus their radical equality, which could never be inferred from their worldly 
existence as living animals, endowed with bodies and languages, but requires the traversal 
of the ontological dimension and the eruption of the event. Nonetheless, it is important to 
stress that the truth that ensues from this eruption is not an idea transcendent in relation to 
these bodies and languages but rather the result of the painstaking working through the 
ontological consequences of the fact of there being them and only them. Badiou’s formula 
‘there are only bodies and languages, except that there are truths’ may then be completed 
as ‘there are only bodies and languages, except that there is also the truth of their equality’. 
 
From this perspective, Badiou’s critique of the biopolitics of democratic materialism remains 
fully valid but needs to be rearticulated. As we have argued, it is impossible to oppose a 
politics of truth to the biopolitics of ‘life without Idea’, firstly because the politics of truth 
ends up in need of the living body to sustain itself and, secondly, because the biopolitics of 
mere life turns out to be governed by ideas of freedom, tolerance or multiculturalism that, 
however flawed they might appear to Badiou(ans), are entirely irreducible to mere 
attributes of bare life. The problem with the biopolitics of democratic materialism is not that 
it is devoid of truths transcending the speaking body of the human animal. There is instead a 
whole market of such ‘truths’ in contemporary ‘democratic-materialist’ societies, from self-
help to self-fulfilment, from tried and true religion to the most eccentric alternative 
spiritualities. The problem is rather that these ‘truths’ are too transcendent, utterly 
disconnected from the ontological equality of the bodies and languages and instead 
producing new hierarchies and divisions that have no ontological foundation whatsoever. To 
oppose this biopolitics one does not need to compete with it in inventing ever more 
transcendent truths but should rather focus on the one truth that is wholly immanent to 
whatever world it unfolds in, the truth that whatever is in the world is equal to whatever 
else there is in it. Affirmative biopolitics affirms neither a nihilistic life ‘without idea’ nor the 
domination of bare life by ideas of good life but the political consequences of the facticity of 
life as such. 
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